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ABSTRACT
Multi-vector Energy Distribution Systems (EDS) are increas-
ingly connected to provide new services to consumers and
Distribution Network Operators (DNO). This exponential
growth in connectivity, while beneficial, tremendously in-
creases the attack surface of critical infrastructures, demon-
strating a clear need for energy operator cyber-security train-
ing. This paper highlights the cyber-security challenges faced
by EDS operators as well as the impact a successful cyber-
attack could have on the grid. Finally, training needs are
contextualised through cyber-attack examples.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructures (CI) present an ideal target for state
actors and crime groups due to their large attack surface
composed of intertwined Information Technology (IT) and
Operational Technology (OT) networks. Over the last decade,
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numerous innovations have spawned in the energy sector
strengthening the reliance of society on these infrastructures
by providing new services such as smart-meters, micro-grids,
etc. While these services provide numerous advantages to
DNO and end-users, they rely heavily on the technologies un-
derpinning them. This reliance on technology was further ex-
acerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic when key-workers
were required to work from home, managing CI remotely [15].
The increased connectivity has also allowed the automation of
energy infrastructures for both manufacturers and producers.
While these advances are beneficial, this new paradigm re-
quires operators to understand new cyber-attacks and threat
vectors underpinning remote-working and the advances in
multi-vector energy distribution systems. Training is there-
fore essential to differentiate a fault from a cyber-attack, as
the course of action will be different based on the issue at
hand. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows;
Section 2 provides an overview of multi-vector energy systems.
Section 3 defines the structure and architecture of EDS, Sec-
tion 4 provides a list of cyber-attacks aimed at EDS, Section 5
identifies the future of EDS systems, Section 6 discusses the
training requirements for EDS operators, Section 7 highlights
EU policies for EDS security while Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 MULTI-VECTOR ENERGY
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
Multi-Vector Energy (Electricity, Gas, Heat, and Water) pro-
vides vital services to developed societies and cyber-attacks
will have a growing negative economic and societal impact,
thus representing a major and global risk [3].
Historically, the various sectors constituting the UK energy
system (electricity, gas, water) have operated independently,
with interactions limited to, for example, the provision of gas
to power stations, or liquid fuel to service the transport sector.
The requirement to support the low-carbon transition has
driven an increasing interest in strengthening the integration
between stakeholders operating within the mix of energy
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provisions such that new value streams can be mined across
domains. The evolution is most often referred to as multi-
energy vector integration, the goal being the provision of new
or enhancement of existing services using multiple energy
providers (electricity, heat, gas, hydrogen).
The multi-vector energy systems allow fast transactions
allowing multi-energy grids, without the necessity of a cen-
tralised energy dispatch. One of the main spines that facilitate
the migration to a fully integrated operational environment
are frameworks that provide trusted interactions, guarantee
resilience, and in turn long-term stability of the large-scale in-
frastructure. The integration of multi-vector energy systems
necessitates a secure and reliable implementation of essential
control, protection, scheduling, and monitoring systems. Nev-
ertheless, to achieve robust and agile control, it is expected
that the low-level communication layer will be directly linked
between the various sources of energy.
3 STRUCTURES OF MULTI-VECTOR EDS
Multi-vectors EDS systems are based on 4 distinct layers
namely; I) Process and Control, II) Operations and Man-
agement Zone, III) Enterprise Zone, and IV) External zone
as depicted in Figure 2. Layer 2, 3, and 4 are common to
most energy sectors as they focus essentially on the control,
monitoring, and reporting aspects. While Layer 1 is dedicated
to specific energy sectors. Furthermore, it is possible for the
low-level layers to interact directly which various energy sec-
tors, to achieve resilience, fast responses and overall enhanced
stability of the system. Figure 1 is an adapted Purdue Models,
as defined in IEC 62443, demonstrating the reference levels
and security zone applicable to EDS.
Digitisation of the energy sector provides significant opera-
tional benefits. However, the widespread use of digital commu-
nications and inter-connectivity between organisations and
systems induces a significant risk from cyber-attack. This risk
further increases as the energy sectors move towards smart
grid and Distribution System Operations (DSO), resulting in
an increased attack surface[9] Furthermore, each zone should
have its own security boundary and requirements should meet
the desired security attributes to support the desired level of
security for that zone. This means that the assets, systems,
and services within the zone need to be examined and key
features identified. Also it is necessary to realise that the
assets, systems or services may have interactions with other
equipment or information systems both internally or external
to the system, increasing the security risk.
4 EDS CYBER-ATTACKS
4.1 Types of cyber-attacks
A wide range of cyber- attacks have been identified in the
literature but the most common types that targeted the
energy sector include the following [6] [10]:
∙ Malicious software (Malware): is a program or file that
is designed to harm a device or user. The existing types
of malware include:
Virus: It replicates itself when it is executed on a
computer.
Worm: It replicates itself to spread to computers
through the network. It relies on security failures of
the other computers in the network.
Trojan horse: provides a backdoor to malicious users.
Ransomware: threatens a victim to publish data or
block access to the system for a ransom
Spyware: It gathers information from the system,
stealing, internet usage and sensitive data, trying to
hack another entity.
Adware: It generates unwanted advertisements on a
device.
∙ Denial of Service (DoS): aims at denying the usage
of a service or machine to a legitimate user or set
of users. The attack typically involves flooding the
services or resources with more requests than they
can handle, or sending specially crafted requests that
crash the application. A subset of DoS attacks is the
Distributed Denial of Service (DDos), in which case the
requests originate from numerous different computers
throughout.
∙ Social engineering: in this type of attack the users can
be tricked into divulging confidential information. The
social engineering attacks mainly rely on the human
interaction with the most common examples include
phishing and spear phishing.
Phishing: it includes deceptive emails, websites and
text message.
∙ Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): is a type of attack
where an unauthorised party gains an extended access
to a system. APT require extensive experience of the
systems [11].
4.2 Cyber-attacks in the energy sector
Over the last decade, numerous cyber-attacks have been con-
ducted against energy companies throughout the world. Most
of them have targeted electricity production and distribution.
One of the first widely-known attacks that was targeted
against an energy company was the Stuxnet worm, that was
discovered in 2010. It was originally aimed at Iran’s nuclear fa-
cilities, targeting the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
used to automate machine processes, eventually damaging
the centrifuges required by the nuclear plant. It was the first
known virus to be capable of crippling hardware. In the fol-
lowing years, Stuxnet and its descendants have affected every
fourth power company in the world [16].
Another significant attack occurred on December 23, 2015,
but this time against the electricity distributors of Ukraine.
Using the BlackEnergy 3 malware the attackers gained access
into the network and systems of multiple energy distributors.
The malware was initially distributed through spear phishing
attacks, while the malware itself was disguised (infected
MS Word attachment) [14], [29]. That was the first part of
the attack while the second part of the attack targeted the
restoration efforts though the usage of the KillDisk attack.
On the Importance of Cyber-Security Training for Multi-Vector Energy Distribution System OperatorsARES 2020, August 25–28, 2020, Virtual Event, Ireland
EXTERNAL ZONE
EXTERNAL SYSTEMS
Cloud, Remote Users, etc.
ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Corporate Network
ENTERPRISE ZONE
EDS SECURITY GATEWAY
IT/OT Interface
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
EMS/EDS
SUPERVISORY MONITORING &
CONTROL 
HMI, SCADA, Remote Processes
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT  ZONE
LOCAL MONITORING AND CONROL 
HMI, Local Processes
CONTROL, SAFETY and PROTECTION
PLCs, RTUs, IEDs, DCS
EQUIPMENT
I/O
GAS
PROCESS CONTROL ZONE
WATER
LOCAL MONITORING AND CONROL 
HMI, Local Processes
CONTROL, SAFETY and PROTECTION
PLCs, RTUs, IEDs, DCS
EQUIPMENT
I/O
PROCESS CONTROL ZONE
LOCAL MONITORING AND CONROL 
HMI, Local Processes
CONTROL, SAFETY and PROTECTION
PLCs, RTUs, IEDs, DCS
EQUIPMENT
I/O
ELECTRICITY
PROCESS CONTROL ZONE
Figure 1: Multi-Vector CPS Energy System
The impact of the attack was tremendous as it caused a
blackout for six-hours for over 250.000 citizens [17], [24].
One year later, a second attack targeted the power grid of
Ukraine which caused a blackout for one hour in a fifth of
Kiev [13].
The attackers used a malware called Industroyer, capable
of controlling substation switches and circuit breakers via
standardized industrial communication protocols. Later, re-
search indicated, that the intent of the attackers might have
been to cause physical damage to the power transmission
systems at the time of recovery, not just shut it down for an
hour [4], [8], [13].
The U.S.A. energy generation provider, sPower, was hit
by a DoS attack in 2019. The attack disrupted the com-
munication between the control center of the company and
the field devices. The disruption was not continuous but
was happening every five minutes while lasting for twelve
hours [5], [28].
Energy companies have also been suffering attacks against
their billing and automated meter reading (AMR) systems. In
2018, the AMR system of Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam
(UHBVN) has been hacked and their billing data encrypted
with ransomware. The hackers demanded $153,800 in Bitcoin
from government of Haryana for decryption of the files and
restoring access to the system [1]. There is at least one open-
source tool called Termineter available for communicating to
the smart-meters via their optical interface [23].
There are reports of attacks against oil production com-
panies in Saudi Arabia. In 2012, Armaco, was hit by the
disk-wiping malware Shamoon, also known as W32.Distrack.
Tens of thousands of computers were infected, displaying
a burning U.S. flag [20]. The hackers were believed to be
working for the Iranian government [2]. In 2017, a rare and
dangerous type of malware dubbed Triton was spotted in
Middle East. It was targeting safety systems commonly used
by oil companies [7]. No damage were reported, but the idea
of crippling safety systems of an industrial process without
hindering the process itself is extremely dangerous, as it can
remain unnoticed for a long period of time. [26].
The referred attacks against electricity and oil production
are mostly denial of critical services. Although disruption
of such services can have a vast effect on the economy, not
only for the energy companies, but also to all the affected
consumers, the implications of cutting off supplies can be
lowered by implementing redundancy or backup. In March
2016, Verizon reported attacks against an undisclosed water
treatment plant, identified by the fake moniker "Kemuri
Water Company" (KWC). The report described how hackers
initially targeted public-facing web server of KWC, that were
running on an outdated platform, with the intent of stealing
customer data. The hackers later pivoted through the systems
that were interconnected, eventually gaining access to PLCs
that managed the amount of chemicals used to treat the
water in order to make it drinkable, as well as the water flow
rate. It was considered likely, that the attackers didn’t realize
their opportunity to poison the tap water [27].
5 DEVELOPING FUTURE
CYBER-PHYSICAL ENERGY SYSTEMS
In most of the cyber-physical studies the effect of a cyber-
attack on the physical domain is represented as a faulty
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operation. This can only provide information on the sever-
ity of the attack, without exposing the propagation of the
attack [31]. Therefore, future studies may need to observe
the interaction between the cyber and physical domains in
order to identify, detect or even prevent attacks.
Future operators need to consider cyber-security into the
energy system design. This may be achieved by increasing the
redundancies on three different aspects; protection, hardware,
and control. Also, as some business models allow only sepa-
rate contracts among services it may be crucial to provide
independent investigation on forensics post analysis whether
the equipment failures are due to faults, mismanagement or
cyber-attacks.
Figure 2: Simulations waveforms of an HVDC transmission
system, when a cyber-attack modifies the measurements by
2%
(a) Line voltages
(b) Line currents
Figure 3: Simulations waveforms of a three sources transmis-
sion system when a cyber-attack enables one of the protection
relays during normal operation.
Energy system operators are reluctant on modifying the
protection system, as it may jeopardise the discrimination
and the sensitivity performance as any change of the propri-
etary settings may jeopardise the system’s stability. Moreover,
the widely-used industrial communication standards don’t
have security features built into their original versions [12].
Upgrading can be costly and complicated, as special-purpose
devices have limited computing power that can’t handle
e.g. modern cryptography, they might also lack options for
upgrading their firmware. Increasing the redundancies on
the hardware equipment, such as energy paths, energy hubs
etc, is a straightforward solution. However, the extra cost
of investment may not be justified by the risk. The most
inexpensive adjustment is that of adopting new control meth-
ods which react upon a cyber-attack detection [25]. Also,
implementing reactive controllers may reduce the cost of
the aforementioned equipment redundancies. However these
controls will highly depend on the speed and discrimination
of cyber-attack detections.
Therefore, operators may need to implement cyber-attack
detection algorithms which allow their equipment, control
and protection to act accordingly. These algorithms may
detect the cyber-attacks through proxies (e.g. measurements
of voltage, pressures etc) to identify an abnormal operation.
This may appear to be challenging for cyber-attacks that
targeting fast transient events e.g. opening a protection relay.
Nonetheless, for long-term events this may be a viable solu-
tion for saving equipment’s lifespan, reduce the maintenance
costs and avoid costly investment on redundant equipment.
FigureA2 shows the possible effect of a long term undetected
cyber-attack, where a negligible change on the measurements
may affect the lifespan of the equipment by increasing the
current stresses. In addition as the current increases, the
thermal losses increase proportionally, hence additional oper-
ational costs are billed to the operator [30]. Figure 3 shows a
fast transient event, when a cyber-attack disables a protec-
tion relay. The system may consider this operation as a fault,
activating the protection systems. This kind of event may
jeopardise the stability of the energy systems and equipment
may be damaged, with likelihood of blackout.
6 TRAINING NEED
The high level of accessibility and integration of different
power systems, the advent of distributed energy resources,
smart metering and ICT-based grid observability has raised
new challenges for the power sector. The power systems
are being digitised and face advanced cyber-security threats
regularly. Cyber-risks can emerge out of a great variety of
operations, focused on the technical functionalities of EDS,
data breach of market participants and customers, or a com-
bination of both, that could initiate adverse security threats.
Cyber security in multi-vector energy distribution environ-
ment requires skilled personnel and well-prepared administra-
tors to take proactive choices of teaming up with partners to
train at the cutting-edge. Employees will have to keep their
skills up to date with the new security solutions for Smart
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Grids as well as understand the impact of cyber-attacks and
fault on multiple systems.
Their theoretical background must be enriched and sup-
ported through hands-on training exercises. Realistic training
enhances the preparedness of personnel at all hierarchical
levels either horizontally or vertically depending on the role of
the personnel. Such roles may include, but are not limited to
administrative or technical cyber-security professionals at all
levels. The need for cybersecurity expertise has increased in
an exponential manner, a fact that increases the importance
of educating personnel. Highly skilled operators are needed
by the industry as the number of cyber-threats and inge-
nuity of attackers grows. To be able to meet the increasing
requirements, the synergies of education must be considered
along with professional training and certification programs to
establish the basics of cyber-security. This can be addressed
by new teaching and knowledge transfer methods that rely
on technical exercises.
The attacks described in section 4.2 express certain com-
mon properties. In the modern era, malware do not spread
on their own, like classical computer viruses used to. Instead,
they are delivered within a compromised software (update)
package, phishing e-mails, malicious links, USB flash drives,
or other means that involve social engineering or require
human interactions. This means, that attackers often gain
initial footprint in the target network with the help of an
unaware employee. Another common pattern is that it is easy
for attackers to pivot through the internal network of the
victim from publicly accessible systems, like homepage or
self-service portal, to most critical parts of the infrastructure,
that are controlling the production processes. These attacks
indicate a lack of network segregation and other security mea-
sures. Emerging trends of implementing multi-vector EDS
greatly enhance the risk, allowing attackers to pivot not only
within a single company or domain, but move laterally to
other dimensions of EDS. This raises the need for new type
of awareness training - e.g. how an operator can prevent its
equipment and facilities from being used as a proxy to attack
other parts of EDS. The topics include learning to identify
patterns that could be used to attack someone else’s sys-
tems, monitoring and blocking outgoing traffic. These types
of attacks are often overlooked in training.
Energy distribution systems are often made up of very
different devices, that can vary even within a single company
or small geographic area [18]. The roots of European power
grids are in the 19th century. Most power stations and sub-
stations are decades old and contain legacy hardware and
software. Substations built in 1970-s initially had manual
control, or simple automation based on mechanical relays
with electrical control. When the relays reached end of life,
or broke down, they were replaced with more modern ones.
Better-lasting items could have some add-ons installed to
allow connecting them to computer-driven control systems.
Such replacements and upgrades don’t take place all at once
due to high cost, but on a necessity basis. This leads to
a situation where substations can contain equipment from
different eras and different manufacturers increasing the the
training need of multi-vector energy distribution operators.
These heterogeneous systems composed of legacy devices
create extra challenges on developing protections. Different
devices have different features and glitches, leading to com-
patibility issues and limitations. Every firmware has its own
set of bugs, creating a wide attack footprint - if an attack
doesn’t succeed on one device, it can be tried on another.
The training methodologies and content should take this
into account. Training should have options that raise general
awareness of cyber-attacks, how to identify them and react
upon incidents. Such type of training would help in develop-
ing effective cyber-attack detection algorithms and systems.
There should also be hands-on training options for personnel,
who work daily with the energy distribution equipment and
supporting infrastructure. This is challenging, as the devices
from different manufacturers or different eras don’t share
the same user-interfaces and may have different functionality.
Conducting training in an over-simplified lab will take the
trainees too far from their usual working environment and
they might lose focus, as operating a unfamiliar device re-
quires too much attention and the obtained knowledge cannot
be easily transferred back to everyday job. It is therefore
essential to simulate and emulate environments that are as
close as the real ones.
7 ENERGY SPECIFIC EU POLICY
Cyber-security in the energy sector has become of utmost
importance in European Commission (EC). In that way,
EC has promoted key strategic documents outlining the EU
policies in the domain of energy:
∙ European Energy Security Strategy: it has been laid
down by the EC in May 2014. This document identi-
fies the status quo and points out the immediate and
long term actions to ensure the energy security in the
EU [21].
∙ Energy Union Package: its aim is to propose specific
measures mainly focusing on the secure and sustain-
able energy for the Europe. The document focuses on
providing an integrated and unified strategy for the
security of supplies, the sustainability of energy as well
as for the competitiveness of the sector [22].
∙ European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion: The Council of the European Union established a
procedure for the identification and designation of Eu-
ropean Critical Infrastructures (ECI). The policy aims
at improving the protection of ECI. In the adopted Di-
rective three energy critical sub-sectors were identified,
namely; electricity, oil and gas [19].
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper we highlighted the need for critical EDS op-
erators to understand the attack-vectors and threats faced
by multi-vector energy systems to improve their response
time, as well as providing them with the ability to differenti-
ate between faults and cyber-attacks. We also provided an
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overview of cyber-attacks faced by EDS and highlighted the
need for the integration of security and privacy at the core
of the development of future cyber-physicial systems. The
future work will concentrate on the development of a train-
ing methodology aimed at multi-vector energy distribution
system operators.
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